Conclusões da Comissão de Inquérito à Crise (USA)

Em Portugal, diz-se, a crise tem, sobretudo, origem no facto de o povo estar a viver acima das suas possibilidades. Nos Estados Unidos, a Comissão de Inquérito à Crise Financeira põe o dedo na ferida de outro modo: parece que o erro é um pouco mais grave e vai desde a má gestão à falta de ética na condução dos negócios. Eis a síntese dessas conclusões no formato de transcrição de títulos:

 

1. We conclude this financial crisis was avoidable.
2. We conclude widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial markets.
3. We conclude dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important financial institutions were a key cause of this crisis.
4. We conclude a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency put the financial system on a collision course with crisis.
5. We conclude the government was ill prepared for the crisis, and its inconsistent response added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial markets.
6. We conclude there was a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics.
7. We conclude collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline lit and spread the flame of contagion and crisis.
8. We conclude over-the-counter derivatives contributed significantly to this crisis.
9. We conclude the failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction.